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Abstract 
 
This dissertation thesis examines the field of M&A in shipping industry. The 
basic purpose of this research is to investigate the behavior of shipping firms’ stock 
returns before and after the announcements of takeover deals. Moreover, it brings into 
focus the corporate governance implications in a potential corporate deal.  The sample 
of employed event study analysis is constituted of the biggest M&A deals during the 
last decade in order to evaluate the synergistic effects of an M&A in shareholders’ 
value. Furthermore, this paper assesses some major corporate governance characteristics 
of the acquirer with the most important value creation. The empirical results indicate the 
positive impact that M&A announcements of company takeovers cause in shareholders’ 
value. This impact of corporate deals is highly important and creates financial value 
especially for the target firm in the shipping industry. The empirical findings underline 
the central role of corporate governance in the shipping firms which can influence the 
response of a firm in a potential corporate deal. 
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 4 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades, the intensified competition has triggered a major 
consolidation in all market segments which is reflected in Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A) activity. International competition and financial markets has recently interested 
many corporations in the link between corporate governance and economic 
performance. The term of Corporate Governance has to do with the way of managing 
and controlling in corporations. It has relatively recently come to prominence in the 
business world and its everyday usage in the financial press is a new phenomenon of the 
last fifteen years or so. Chistine Mallin, the writer of the relevant book “Corporate 
Governance”, states that the development of Corporate Governance is a quite complex 
subject which includes legal, cultural, ownership and other structural differences. A lack 
of effective corporate governance has been linked to past major corporate collapses such 
as Enron case despite the healthy picture of their annual reports. Good corporate 
governance not only it could prevent investors from such corporate collapses, but also it 
could gain their confidence.  
Generally speaking, a merger or an acquisition is a corporate strategy which deals 
with buying, selling, dividing or combining different or many times similar companies 
in order to create a new larger entity. It is undisputable that this procedure involves 
great risk for shareholders. Consequently, an event of merger or acquisition affects in a 
great extent the shareholder’s value. However, synergistic effects of M&A activities 
cannot be realized unless there is a good corporate governance model. Monks Robert 
A.G. and Minow Nell supported in their book “Corporate Governance” in 2007 that the 
corporate with better governance and more shareholders rights will survive after an 
M&A. In other words, if the bidder has better corporate governance than the target firm, 
this means that it can take advantage of employing the acquired assets more effectively. 
Hence, it is undisputable that this creates further value to the corporation. 
International trade has become an important part of the global economy and more 
than 80 percent of world trade travels by ship. So, in this rapid growth of global 
economy, the bigger competition of maritime transportation forced shipping 
managements to take over heavier tasks and make major strategic decisions of M&As. 
The cyclical nature of the business favors the strength and momentum of larger groups, 
so this period could perhaps provide a natural opportunity for firms to seek out mutually 
beneficial M&A activity. It is also worth noting that Corporate Governance is one of the 
top issues in the corporations of the shipping industry, for the reason that it plays 
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important role in value creation after a shipping merger or takeover. In reality, it 
specifies the responsibilities and the rights of different corporate parties, such as 
managers and shareholders, and contributes to the balanced function of the firm.  
 
i. Shipping Industry and M&A deals 
 
Grammenos (2010, pp.9) in “The handbook of Maritime Economics and Business” 
defined shipping industry as a unified sector in the 19th century. During the first 70 
years, liner and tramp shipping moved in the same lines. Their shipping activities were 
not clearly defined. Nevertheless, during the last third of the same century the shipping 
market split into two categories, liner (finished or semi-finished manufactured goods) 
and tramp (coal, ore, grain, fertilizers etc.) shipping. Moreover, after the 2nd World War 
there was an unprecedented increase of world production and trade which caused more 
structural changes in shipping market. There were new cargoes that they are in need of 
shipping transportation. Consequently, the appearance of these new liquid and dry bulk 
cargoes was the reason for building new type of ships and developing specialized bulk 
markets. On the contrary to the behavioral pattern of tramp shipping which did not 
involve important changes, the real revolutionary period for liner shipping, and 
generally in the shipping industry was during the 1960s and even more during the 1970s 
which called the period of containerization. The world container fleet had increased by 
six times from 1970 to 1980. At the same time, liner shipping changes demanded 
excessive investments in infrastructure and led to structural changes of the industry like 
new designs of vessels, greater production of ships and ports. This total transformation 
was an important benefit for the shipping companies of liner shipping sector for the 
reason that it provoked a great decrease in the cost of transportation. During the 1990s, 
all these intensive capital investments were further provoked by the trend to 
globalization. Companies of liner shipping were required to meet their customers’ 
expectations and needs around the globe. These circumstances led to mega mergers, 
strategic alliances and a general consolidation in shipping industry. Hence, global 
merger and acquisitions was the necessary step forward for the enlargement of 
companies in order to satisfy the global excess demand for shipping services.  
It is undisputable that shipping industry holds a fundamental role in international 
trade and it is highly correlated with the economic activity of the global economy. The 
maritime shipping industry offers beneficial influence for the trading activities due to 
the fact that it is the only practicable and cost effective means of transporting large 
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quantities of many necessary commodities and goods. The main segments of shipping 
industry are the following: tankers, which transfer coal, grain etc., containerships which 
carry only containers, and gas tankers which carry mainly LPG and LNG. The 
transportation of both goods and passengers are the two cornerstones of the global 
shipping industry. However, the largest product segment within this industry is 
international freight transport. The sector of Seaborne international freight transport 
refers to the transportation of goods globally, between foreign and domestic ports by 
sea. It has grown almost continuously since the 2ndWorld War and it continues to be the 
dominant mode of transport for the international trade. Evident fact is that it occupies 
69.1% of industry revenue. Moreover, the percentage of 90% of global production is 
traded between countries by sea.  It is also worth noting that a percentage of 70% of the 
world’s merchant fleet is tankers and bulk carriers, in terms of deadweight tons. 
Generally speaking, the behavioral pattern of shipping business is related to a number of 
factors, including macroeconomic, microeconomic and policy-oriented factors. The 
performance of this industry depends on the same broad factors that determine 
economic performance such as gross domestic product (GDP), and the level of trade and 
growth within industries that use ships as a mode to transport cargo. Nevertheless, 
shipping sector includes many risk factors for the reason that it is prone to market 
changes. Moreover, it is highly competitive and many times it presents considerable 
fluctuations. Some of the crucial factors which contribute to the cyclicality and the 
riskiness of shipping industry are the demand for maritime transportations which 
derives and is directly related to economic growth, the cyclical nature of freight rates, 
vessel prices, imbalances of supply and demand. 
 
Table 1: Average Value per tonne of cargo, international trade, 2000-2006 
Average value                                          
per tonne                                                      
of cargo ($) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Airborne 56,624 51,241 50,445 54,415 55,503 59,71 63,184 
Seaborne 625 601 617 698 772 861 943 
Overland and 
other 
1482 1606 1542 1531 1746 1827 1878 
All modes 863 836 843 923 1008 1109 1205 
Source: Grammenos (2010, pp. 38) 
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According to recent studies, total annual world seaborne trade was estimated at 7.2 
billion metric tonnes, of which drybulk cargoes amounted to 2.6 billion tonnes and oil 
cargoes amounted to 2.6 billion tones. The following table indicates the growth rates of 
various cargoes that comprise all shipping and trading activities around the world. As it 
is easily observable, global container trade holds the highest growth rate (9.9%) which 
exceeds by far the annual growth rate of world seaborne trade (3.8%).  
 
 
 
Table 2: World Deep Sea Fleet 
 Fleet Order Book 
 No. mill. dwt % dwt No. mill. dwt % of flt % of dwt 
Containerships 3848 121,8 12,9% 1286 58.1 21,10% 47.7% 
Tankers 
>10.000dwt 
4197 357,7 37,9% 1427 118.7 43,00% 33.2% 
Tankers 
<10.000dwt 
2050 10,3 1,1% 302 1.7 0,60% 16.9% 
Bulkers 6271 358,8 38,0% 877 72.7 26,40% 20.3% 
LPG Carriers 1019 11,8 1,2% 193 4.7 1,70% 40.1% 
Lng Carriers 213 14,4 1,5% 136 12.1 4,40% 83.9% 
Other 6546 68,6 20,2% 2029 65.8 23,90% 34.6% 
Source: Clarkson Research 
 
 It is obvious that seaborne trade is an inextricable link in the globalized 
production and distribution chains. In this highly competitive environment, 
globalization was both a constraint and a strategy for shipping firms to concentrate on 
the increase of efficiency and cost minimizations which are the driving forces for 
merger, acquisitions and strategic alliances. M&A activity continue to be a highly 
popular form of corporate development. It is also worth noting that the tremendous 
number of 30.000 M&A deals was completed in global market in 2004. In other words, 
this means one transaction every 18 minutes (Susan Cartwright and Richard Schoenberg 
2006). 
Veljković and Petrović (2011) distinguish between two kinds of takeovers: on 
condition that target company’s board of directors and employees remain stable the 
takeover process can be characterized as friendly. Hence, the basic characteristics are 
mutual consent and joint agreement. Moreover, a process of friendly takeover aims to 
improve operating performance and create synergies. On the other hand, a company 
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takeover against the wishes of shareholders, management and/or the board of directors 
is defined as a hostile takeover process. The basic distinction from a friendly process is 
the tender offer which is often combined with a premium over the market value of 
“attacked” company. Most of the times the basic motive of a hostile takeover is to 
achieve economies of scale.  
Generally speaking, there are many reasons for wishing to engage in mergers and 
acquisitions. There is a need of investment in technological innovations, expansion into 
new areas, improvement of shareholder value, economies of scale, reach global size and 
reduction of costs. There are two common motives for M&A activity. According to 
Gaughan 2001, the most important reason is growth. Corporations can grow internally 
and externally. Internal growth can be quite slow and ineffective when firm tries to 
make some additional short-term profits against its competitors. On the other hand, 
there is the faster alternative for the governance of each corporation of merger or 
acquisition. Even though acquirer has to pay a high premium for a takeover, this total 
cost is not necessarily higher than the total cost of internal growth. However, according 
to the majority of the past literature has noted that the most important reason for which 
a corporation wishes to engage in mergers and acquisitions is future potential synergies. 
Nonetheless, one can be certain that at least one company will benefit from it. Indeed, it 
will be probable that the benefit will be mutual and the combined company will be more 
profitable in many cases. In mathematical terms, synergy can be shown by the following 
equation: 
ܸ݈ܽݑ݁(ܣ + ܤ) > ܸ݈ܽݑ݁(ܣ) + ܸ݈ܽݑ݁(ܤ) 
The combination of two firms can lead to a more valuable financial entity than the 
sum of the value of firms. Furthermore, there are managerial motives of corporate 
governances which suggest M&As. In some cases, managers make decisions seeking 
their own-self interest in order to insure their corporate positions or managerial bonuses 
after such a deal (Syriopoulos and Theotokas 2007). These managerial motives of 
corporate deals are in contradiction to the fundamental rule of corporate governance that 
all corporate actions aim to increase shareholders value.  
It is undisputable that M&A and strategic alliances are the main corporate strategies 
for enhancing value creation. Intensified competition triggered firms to find new ways 
of growth. Consequently, many shipping firms have been formed strategic alliances and 
equity partnerships. In recent times four of the top five carriers are European owned. 
Nonetheless, there were a number of many multinational mergers in the past. As it has 
been mentioned before, containerization period resulted in the restructure of ports and 
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generally of shipping sector. Maritime companies are challenged to redefine their 
principal role in the value chain in charge of the survival and the growth of the 
company. In addition, the experts of maritime industry support that the consolidation 
procedure will continue and may even accelerate. As far as liner shipping is concerned, 
it became an important sector in the 1870s and many agreements have been completed 
with great success which lasted for years. In liner shipping industry, the most common 
deals in M&A activity were strategic alliances which cause substantial changes, 
considerable increase of ships’ size and notable decrease of freight rates. 
Figure 1: M&A deals in Shipping Sector 
 
Source: Bloomberg Database 
In this highly leveraged and capital intensive sector, strategic alliances and other 
types of corporate deals give firms the opportunity to expand their activities by 
enlarging their fleets directly and allocating more ships to serve more markets.  
“Strategic alliances are defined as co-operative agreements in which two or more 
separate organizations team up in order to share reciprocal inputs while maintaining 
their own corporate identities.”, “Mergers and acquisitions occur when independent 
companies combine their operations into one new entity.” (Aksel and Akca 2006). 
According to recent data, most of the top-20 carriers are grouped into three global 
alliances: 
– The NewWorld Alliance: APL, MOL, Hyundai; 
– Grand Alliance: P&O Nedlloyd, NYK, Hapag Lloyd, OOCL and MISC; 
– CKYHS Alliance: Cosco, K-Line, Yang Ming Line and Hanjin-Senator. 
 
Nonetheless there are some “lonely players”. The main ones are: 
– Maersk-Sealand, ranked first after the takeover of P&O Nedloyd 
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–Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. (MSC) 
– CMA-CGM, the world’s third largest container shipping company and is ranked 
number one in France. 
– Evergreen Group operates fourth largest container fleet in the world, with over 
180 ships by capacity of approximately 650,000 TEU. 
– China Shipping, its fleet comprises over 150 vessels with a total operating 
capacity of 560000TEU, ranking among the world's top 10 liner companies. More than 
80 domestic and international services cover more than 100 countries around the world. 
This strong upheaval of alternative forms of organization, mergers, acquisitions or 
strategic alliances over the past decades, increased the attention of academic literature to 
the effects in corporate performance. Despite the fact that mergers and acquisitions do 
not always produce the expected synergistic effects, M&A remains a popular strategy 
for shipping firms who want to concentrate on the improvement of firm’s profitability 
and level of growth. Nonetheless, human resource management problems, high labor 
turnover, lower workforce morale, higher workplace stress and the direct impact on the 
stock price after the completion of an M&A are only some of the key reasons that could 
destroy corporate value.  
 
ii. Corporate Governance framework 
 
Corporate governance issue interest many academic researchers across around the 
globe, especially during the recent financial crisis which led to devastating corporate 
collapses. What it should be mentioned is that limited number of studies has researched 
the interrelation between corporate governance which responds to value creation 
through mergers and acquisitions and the synergistic effects of such a corporate deal in 
shipping industry. Most of studies have concentrated on the development of corporate 
governance, ownership structure, and their interrelation with the stock and bank or firm 
performance in general.  
“Corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws, and 
institutions affecting the way a corporation (or company) is directed, administered or 
controlled.” Wikipedia (2011) 
 The process of decision making on mergers and acquisitions responds to the 
actions of board of directors of the company and it takes place in the company’s 
governance. The primary goal of corporate governance concerns the maximization of 
corporate value for the sake of shareholders and any other contributive part in the 
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growth of the company.  During the last decade, the issue of efficient corporate 
governance has risen to prominence and concentrated a lot of attention to corporate 
policy makers.  
In the corporate framework, one of the most important relationships is between the 
managers and owners of the firm. This relationship is a classic example of principal-
agent relationship and concerns conflicting goals where the managers behave for their 
own interest instead of acting for shareholders’ interest. Hence, agency theory, which is 
introduced in the book “Corporate Governance” by Christine Mallin (2006), highlights 
the principal agent relationship in a corporation. Particularly, in the corporate 
governance framework the agents are the managers and the principals are the 
shareholders. However, managers must be monitored and they must provide 
reassurances that they do not abuse their power. The accrued costs of the corporate 
governance system to avert managers to act for their self-interest are called “agency 
costs”. Corporate governance can be used to reduce the total agency costs through 
monitoring managers actions and aligning conflicting interests. Additionally, there is 
another key issue of information asymmetry when the principal and the agent have not 
the same level of information.  
Moreover, another key corporate issue that concentrates a lot of attention is 
“transaction cost economics” (Mallin 2006). This theory which affected the 
development of corporate governance gave the opportunity to many historical authors to 
highlight the role of corporate governance in strategic decisions. Mergers or 
acquisitions lead to inflows of new “fresh” internal capital for the corporation. 
Moreover, there are major incentives for firm conglomerates for the reason that it is 
much more beneficial to undertake transactions internally than externally. It is 
undisputable that there are plenty of transaction costs between principal and agent, like 
costs of negotiating, writing or during the course of the contract. Corporate governance 
mechanism consist a vital part of a firm in a world of agency problems.  Consequently, 
these particular theories, agency theory and transaction cost economics, are concerned 
with managerial discretion. Managers may opportunistically make decisions seeking 
their own self-interest which is many times against the shareholders’ interest. The case 
of a merger or an acquisition is a characteristic example of conflicting interests. On the 
one hand, managers of the target firm may be in danger of losing their positions after 
such a deal. Hence, managers prefer their company to be the survivor in the post-merger 
successor firm with the fear of losing their seats. This consists major disincentive for a 
merger or an acquisition. Moreover, it is also possible to accept a lower post-merger 
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premium for the corporation in order to receive a job position in the successor company. 
On the other hand, shareholders of target firms can get a substantial premium in an 
M&A deal. Consequently, it is crucial for the corporation to have an efficient corporate 
governance structure in order to manage these conflicting incentives and interests and 
avoid opportunistic behaviors. Unless there are appropriate conditions, a takeover may 
lead to disastrous consequences (Syriopoulos and Theotokas 2007). 
 The major object of this research is to examine how a potential merger or 
acquisition could create synergistic effects measuring the post-merger performance and 
to evaluate the corporate governance implications after a shipping takeover. The biggest 
M&A deals of the last decade in shipping sector are undertaken in order to apply an 
event study model.  The rest of the dissertation thesis is organized as follows: Section 
2 reviews the relevant past literature. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results and concludes.       
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2. Literature Review 
 
As it has been emphasized before, sea transportation plays a key role in world trade 
and economic growth in general. Globalization with continuously increasing 
competition in an environment with lightning technological changes has increased the 
number of corporations. Meanwhile, periods of slow growth and generally crises like 
the most recent with its massive consequences triggered major conglomerates. In this 
environment, ownership structure and broadly corporate governance implications in a 
potential takeover rank high in the agenda of economists. Hence, corporate restructuring 
through M&A rose to prominence important issues related to business decisions.  
The separation between ownership and management opens the possibility of insider 
abuse. Hence, this crucial issue for the sustainability of corporations remains high on 
the agenda of economists. On the other hand, the separation of control and ownership of 
corporations was unavoidable after the big industrialization of developed countries, like 
USA and UK, where there is a robust law system which protects the minorities (Mallin 
2006). However, this broad shareholder base is not equally applicable to other 
corporations. By contrast, ownership concentration is a basic characteristic of 
governance system of German firms. Even in bad times, German firms keep stable their 
large stockholders and their ownership structure hardly changes over time (Lehmann 
and Weigand 2000). Furthermore, corporate collapses and scandals have increased 
pressure to shareholders to act as owners and not as simple holders of shares. Should 
shareholders act as owners, they will directly affect the board of each corporation. 
Hence, boards will be accountable for their actions and the firm control will be returned 
to shareholders. Moreover, strategic management literature has focused on agency 
theory as a link between ownership structure and economic performance. Agency 
problem is an important determinant of firm’s operating performance. More 
specifically, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) studied the largest European companies and 
introduced that ownership concentration is not linearly related to economic 
performance. After a critical point, ownership concentration leads to adverse effects. 
Furthermore, they supported that corporate restructures may lead to additional gains. 
The better the relationship between corporate strategy and ownership structure is, the 
bigger the potential benefits. On the other hand, corporate strategies that do not match 
corporate governance are not sustainable for the reason that they may not fit decision-
makers’ intentions. Despite of all these important introduced concepts between 
ownership structure and economic performance, a lot of attention has been paid in the 
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owners’ identity that has been neglected by past relevant literature. Owner’s identity is 
found to be as important as ownership concentration and this is the key element so as to 
understand the corporate governance of European firms because of the higher 
ownership concentration in the European firms. 
According to Lehmann and Weigand, for a corporation to be governed, it is vital 
that the corporate control is separated from the ownership. However, insider control is 
not panacea for the enhancement of corporate performance. Indeed, the location of 
control rights can be a more crucial factor for the governed corporation that this of 
ownership concentration. In many cases and especially in family based firms, large 
shareholders, who usually are the founders of the firm, are much more strongly 
interested in the success of the firm than any other simple investor for whom firm’s 
shares are just an additional financial asset in his portfolio. The presence of large 
shareholder’s does not necessarily mean that it enhances corporate profitability. 
However, operating performance is positively related to investment corporation held 
shares due to the fact that there is protection of managerial opportunism (Lambertides 
and Louca 2008). In line to Thomsen and Pedersen’s research, there is a negative effect 
of ownership concentration to firm’s profitability. Nevertheless, positive impact of 
ownership concentration on profitability and lower agency costs are found when the 
largest shareholders are financial institutions. 
The issue of corporate governance on corporate mergers and acquisitions in Greek 
shipping industry is quite interesting due to the fact that Greek shipping firms are 
basically family owned. The members of the family are the controlling group and there 
is not a real distinction between ownership and management of the firm. Hence, in 
many firms there is a possibility of existence of CEO duality where the same person 
holds the chairman position and he is the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation as 
well. The person who takes over these two crucial positions for the corporation, he 
concentrates great power and this is something that it can be proved positive for the 
corporation for the reason that it is much easier for making decisions or negative 
because he will probably take advantage of his power of this double position which 
holds in order to satisfy private benefits. From the perspective of agency theory, Chief 
Executive Officer (agent) is responsible for utility maximizing and risk minimizing in a 
firm (Iyengar and Zampelli 2009). He makes the appropriate decisions in order to 
improve the welfare at the expense of shareholders (principals). On the other hand, 
Board of Directors supervises the options of Chief Executive Officer. Consequently, 
when a firm present CEO Duality this means that the separation between ownership and 
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management is probably corrupted. However, many Greek shipping firms have started 
changing this strategy in order to assimilate a new more serious business style and build 
up a good reputation to potential investors. Hundreds of firms converted their dual 
leadership structure to non-dual during the period from 1999 to 2003. It had been 
proved that many high profile CEOs abused their major power in the corporation at the 
expense of shareholders (Chen, Li, Yi 2008). Nonetheless, there is no evidence that 
independent outside investors create a more effective board and better corporate 
governance system (Core, Holthausen, Larcker 1999). According to the recent study of 
Syriopoulos and Theotokas, the attitude of the management during the process of a 
forthcoming deal can reveal the efficiency of the corporate governance towards the 
shareholder’s interests. They highlighted that merger deals can have both expansionary 
and contractionary implications. In the first case, the replacement of poorly corporate 
governance systems of the target firms leads to greater efficiency and thus better 
operating performance. On the other hand, many managers may try to complete a 
merger deal so as to satisfy their ambitions (hypothesis of managers’ self-interest). It is 
also introduced that managers may overestimate the potential benefits of a corporate 
deal or underestimate future post-merger costs of integration (hypothesis of managers’ 
hubris).    
Wang and Xie (2007) examined poorly managed firms and investigated the crucial 
issue of value creation. Specifically, the use of corporate governance metrics proved 
that stronger shareholder rights are associated with higher market value and better 
operating performance. Most of the times, a merger or an acquisition leads to change in 
corporate control in the combined firm for the reason that the acquirer, with stronger 
shareholder rights than the target, replaces the target shareholders rights. Following, this 
change in corporate governance causes a major increase in corporate performance due 
to the fact that target’s assets can be used more effectively and generates additional 
value for the combined firm. Higher corporate governance index indicates weaker 
shareholders’ rights because it is more costly and difficult to remove managers from 
their positions. Higher corporate governance levels are followed by lower firm value. 
Consequently, the generated synergistic effects are directly related to the difference 
between the shareholders rights of the bidder and the target. The stronger the 
shareholders’ rights of the acquirer, relative to the target’s, the greater the synergistic 
effects and the better the operating performance of the combined company. Moreover, it 
is notable that both the acquirer’s and the target’s abnormal returns increase and reap 
the benefits from the change in corporate governance. It is undisputable that market 
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assigns valuate in worse levels firms with staggered boards. In many M&A deals, the 
competition between acquirers for corporate control benefits the target firms with 
greater synergistic gains. On the other hand, it is equally possible for targets to compete 
each other and finally the greater synergies accrue to acquirers. 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) researched the impact of ownership structure on 
firm’s profitability. Using a sample of 175 Greek listed firms from all sectors of the 
Greek economy with different ownership concentrations, they documented the existence 
of liner positive relationship between firm’s profitability and ownership structure. 
Consequently, the results from this specific study suggest that the greater the degree of 
ownership concentration the better the corporate governance. 
If M&A deals are driven by the synergistic effects, the long term performance and 
corporate governance of the target firm are significantly improved. On the other hand, 
operating and market performance of acquiring firms decreases significantly after the 
acquisition, especially in the long term (Zhang and Wang 2008). Empirical evidence 
from Chinese listed companies demonstrated that if corporate governance is not 
improved after the deal, it is expected not to be related to the change in the operating 
performance of acquiring firms. Corporate governance affects operating performance 
gradually. As far as the market performance is concerned, Zhang and Wang introduced 
that corporate governance affects positively the firm market performance. However, the 
magnitude and the significance of this positive reaction decrease gradually. Finally, in 
the year after the announce date of the deal there are no significant effect on the firm’s 
market performance. Their research reached the conclusion that Chinese listed 
companies are mainly affected by agency and hubris motive and not by synergies.   
The declaration of a merger or an acquisition causes the increase of abnormal stock 
prices for both the bidder and the target firm during the period before and after the 
announcement date. Sharma (2010) examined a case study of 5 big mega banking 
mergers and noted that a forthcoming deal may be able to benefit not only the merging 
parties but also their rivals due to the general rise of stock prices. On the other, if the 
market expects that the synergistic effects of the merger are sufficiently large to drive 
down prices, the stock prices of the rivals drop down as the probability of the merger 
increases. However, stock prices do not illustrate the real picture of value creation after 
a corporate deal.  Furthermore, using accounting techniques he tried to assess the future 
situation of firm’s assets and liabilities. Nevertheless, using both studies, accounting 
method and event study methodology, his research ended up to contradicting results. 
Finally, this specific research of banking mergers proved that accounting methodology 
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alone cannot predict the value created and each study measures the potential synergistic 
effects in different terms. Hence, he advocated, in most of the previous relevant 
literature, both studies can be employed as substitutes.  
Sinha, Kaushik, and Chaudhary measured the impact of mergers and acquisitions 
on the financial efficiency of business firms during the pre and post-merger periods. 
M&A deals are strongly related to financial performance in the long term and they 
create synergistic effects for the acquirer. All acquiring financial institutions were able 
to generate value. Despite the fact that, profit before tax in all merging cases showed a 
positive trend and an improved financial performance in the post-merger period there 
was a significant increase of debt to equity ratio. 
Kruse, H. Park, K. Park and Suzuki (2002) study investigated the long term 
performance which follows after corporate merger focusing on the corporate 
diversification. When a merger or an acquisition concerns diversity of business, then 
firms gain the highest abnormal returns. In any other circumstance, it is not necessary 
that a merger or an acquisition will destroy or create corporate value. Moreover, a lot of 
attention has been given in the volatilities of M&A activities. According to their 
findings, there was a dramatic increase of M&A activities in the period of reduced 
demand of Japanese goods and oil crisis. Generally speaking, it is obvious that recession 
periods are followed by more acquisitions and mergers between Japanese corporations. 
Finally, their study reported that the long-term operating performance, followed by the 
completion of the deal, is positive but insignificant. In the case of corporate 
diversification, the long-term operating performance is significantly greater than the 
pre-merger corporate performance. The applied event study methodology, in Japanese 
manufacturing firms, highlighted the positive abnormal returns of bidder firms of 
diversifying mergers. There is significant possibility of greater synergistic effects, if the 
target firm is liquidity constrained before the completion of corporate deal.  
Nonetheless, the researchers advocated that rescue mergers are not likely to lead to 
inferior financial efficiency.  
In the last two decades almost all economic sectors witnessed an enormous wave of 
mergers and acquisitions. It was notable that energy market grew rapidly and confronted 
new challenges due to big competition which did not allow many firms to expand as 
they would expect. M&A activity has a significant positive impact on shareholders’ 
stock returns which indicate that firms of energy sector has the ability to benefit and 
grow further after a completion of such a deal (Samitas, Kenourgios, Tsakalos 2008). 
Generally speaking, the market of energy is a relatively new area of investing activity. 
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Hence, merger and acquisitions indicate that the large energy enterprises are in the 
process of expansion and growth which clearly nominate the developing aspect of this 
interesting sector. 
Furthermore, the decade of 1990 witnessed a massive wave of merger and 
acquisition activity in the global telecommunication sector. Globalization, deregulation 
especially in US market and the convergence of digital technologies were the main 
reasons behind this process. However, during periods of slow growth or deregulation, 
wide business instability pushed firms to reduce competition and accomplish 
conglomerates. The bidders succeeded to reduce their exposure to market risk 
controlling larger share of the market. Moreover, acquiring firms spread their risk 
through geographical diversification. Hence, firms that acquired financially weakened 
competitors reaped the benefits of economies of scale (Warf 2003). By contrary, 
empirical evidence from U.S. telecommunication mergers indicated the adverse effects 
of joining a venture. In terms of shareholder returns, merged companies outperformed 
non-merged companies only in the very short term. Furthermore, corporate 
conglomerates don’t generate significant shareholder wealth effects, expected 
economies of scale and they also lead to inferior growth productivity. Consequently, 
merger deals remain unattractive to potential investors in capital markets due to the 
absence of cost-reducing synergies and generally clear effects (Sung and Gort 2007). 
On the contrary to the oligopolistic conditions of liner shipping, tramp shipping 
firms, where vessels do not have a predefined route but it depends on customer’s needs, 
try to remain profitable in conditions of perfect competition. That’s the basic reason for 
the low levels of M&A activity in tramp shipping industry (Samitas and Kenourgios 
2007). The announcements of M&A deals in tramp shipping industry has a strong 
positive affect to stock returns and play a key role to firms’ challenges through creation 
of corporate value. Around the announcement date, these strategic decisions give a 
primary negative impact. However, it is followed by direct positive impact on stock 
returns and significant increase in financial value after the date completion of the deal. 
On the other hand, inside information sometimes leads to differentiated reactions of 
M&A participants. 
Additionally, Panayides and Gong (2002) studied the market reaction to M&A 
deals announcements in liner shipping industry. They came up to the interesting 
conclusion that prominent M&As create expectations to investors and a positive climate 
which causes rapid stock price increase. On the other hand, in the limited shipping 
literature, Brooks and Ritchie (2005) in their research, of M&As in maritime transport 
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industry between 1996-2000, concluded the importance of strategic alliance as a 
corporate internal growth. However, examining the M&A motives they underlined that 
opportunistic behavior plays a substantial role in strategic success.  
To sum up, the majority of the past relevant literature from different sectors has 
indicated a significant positive impact on shareholders stock returns. Indeed, empirical 
evidence from banking mega mergers has shown that a forthcoming deal may lead to a 
general stock price increase in the banking sector.   Nonetheless, the evidence from 
telecommunication industry has approved that merged companies outperformed non-
merged companies only in the very short run. The unattractiveness of merger deals in 
this specific industry come from the fact that they do not lead to expected synergies and 
they lead to inferior growth productivity.  Moreover, a lot of researchers have approved 
strong corporate governance influence in corporate performance and profitability. 
Corporate governance system is a key factor for the post-merger performance. The 
generated synergistic effects are directly related to the difference between the 
shareholders rights of the bidder and the target. Consequently, the stronger the 
shareholders’ rights of the acquirer, relative to the target’s, the greater the synergistic 
effects and the better the operating performance of the combined company. Despite the 
fact that there is limited past literature related to shipping sector, present relative 
literature suggest that prospects of M&A deals give positive stock returns of the 
participants. Nevertheless, the corporate governance characteristics of shipping firms 
cannot be ignored for the reason that opportunistic managers’ behaviors have substantial 
role in success of strategic decisions. The dissertation thesis tries to assess the impact of 
corporate governance on shareholder returns, using an event study model of the biggest 
corporate deals of the last decade in the shipping industry.   
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3. Methodology 
 
During the last 30 years, the issue of value creation after a merger or an acquisition 
has interested many academic researchers. This is for the reason that such a corporate 
deal may require highly leveraged capital decisions with great risk and cause 
unprecedented restructures in all contracting parties of a corporation. The basic motive 
of M&A deals is that the economic result from the combined firm is better than this of 
two separate corporations.  
The data analysis concerns the biggest M&A deals in shipping industry during a 
crucial period for this specific sector from 2001 to 2010 as shown in Table 3. This 
decade deserves further research for the reason that all shipping companies entered in 
“super cycle”. More specifically, the period 2002-2007 is a booming period for entire 
shipping industry with unprecedented increase in freight rates and vessel prices. 
However, this unique boom cycle with its unprecedented earnings growth interrupted by 
the onset of global financial crisis in 2008.  Daily stock prices, index prices and general 
corporate information about these specific corporate deals derive from the Bloomberg 
database and companies’ websites.  
 
Table 3: Shipping Firms announcements about takeovers (2001-2010) 
Bidder Target 
Announcement 
date 
Deal Value($) 
AP Moller - Maersk 
A/S 
D/S 1912 6/5/2003 10901.58M 
Excel Maritime 
Carriers Ltd 
Quintana Maritime 
Ltd 
29/1/2008 2.028.93M 
General Maritime 
Corp 
Arlington Tankers 
Ltd 
6/8/2008 391.33M 
AP Moller - Maersk 
A/S 
Brostrom AB 27/8/2008 1093.43 
Overseas Shipholding 
Group Inc 
Stelmar Shipping 
Ltd 
13/12/2004 1305.4M 
SEACOR Holdings 
Inc 
Seabulk 
International Inc 
16/3/2005 1023.2M 
AP Moller - Maersk 
A/S 
Royal P&O 
Nedlloyd NV 
11/5/2005 2774.85M 
TUI AG CP Ships 22/8/2005 2260.64M 
Source: Bloomberg Database 
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There have been a lot of approaches in order to  examine the practical application of 
this hypothesis. One of the simplest approaches is the research of executives. Despite 
the simplicity of this study which usually includes interviews with executives, their 
expressed opinions in M&A issues are not really related to economic value creation. In 
other words,  
 may not receive the desirable conclusions from this type of studies. A second 
method of studying is the clinical case study. There were many case studies which they 
research each M&A event in depth. However, they finally revealed that the economic 
environment is so complicated that we cannot reach clear conclusions about specific 
benefits and costs of a corporate deal.  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the majority of M&A studies are empirical. 
Generally speaking, event study analysis is a widely accepted research tool in finance, 
business and economics. First of all, event study approach was employed by researchers 
in order to examine the fluctuations of basic accounting indicators of corporation before 
and after the announcement deal. This accounting study methodology tried to assess the 
implications in the operating performance of the bidder and the target firm before and 
after the announcement date of corporate events. However, it is undisputable that the 
most common approach is the abnormal returns methodology. These studies have been 
used to measure the effect of corporate actions in stock price performance in the 
immediate period around the announcement date of corporate events, mergers or 
acquisitions. Since this is so widely used, it is worthwhile to undermine that its major 
weakness is the assumptions that the relative event earns abnormal returns and the 
benchmark used is the right measure to calculate abnormal returns. Nonetheless, the 
event study methodology has dominated because of its simplicity and it is indisputably 
easily applicable. The usefulness of this empirical approach derives from the immediate 
effect in underlying stock prices as a result of M&A announcement, given the 
rationality of the market. Consequently, the implemented event study methodology 
attempts to interpret the market reactions and identify whether the announcements of 
corporate deals cause significant stock price volatilities. 
According to this specific methodology, there are three basic steps in the process of 
its application which are the following: 
o Identify the event window and the particular date of announcement 
o Specify a benchmark model for the calculation of stock return behavior 
o Calculate and analyze Abnormal Returns over the event window 
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The events are tested for possible Abnormal Returns (AR). The ARs are defined as 
the difference between the real and expected returns.  The expected stock returns are 
calculated during the period [T1, T2].  
 
Market model parameters are estimated during the period [-360,-31] in order to be 
unaffected from event announcements. Furthermore, ARs over the event window are 
cumulated in order to produce Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the target and 
the bidder firm separately. Last but not least, the impact on stock price performance is 
measured by testing CAR statistical significance.  
First of all, ARs are constructed in each deal separately. The following market 
model (Equation 1) is used in order to calculate the expected returns. 
 
R୧୲
∗ = α୧ + β୧ × R୫୲ + ε୲ ,  ε୲~N(0, h୲)     (1) 
AR୧୲ = R୧୲ − R୧୲
∗ =R୧୲ − (α୧ + β୧ × R୫୲)     (2) 
 
Where: AR୧୲ is the abnormal attribution of stock i at day t, R୧୲ is the real attribution 
of stock i for event day t and R୧୲
∗  is the expected return of the stock for event day t. 
Furthermore, α୧ measures the mean return on security i over the event period not 
explain by the market, β୧ is the beta coefficient which describes the relation of 
security’s returns and with those of financial market as a whole and ε୲ is the statistical 
error term. The econometric estimation of equation (1) is carried out using the Ordinary 
Least Squares method for specific period supposing that ܣܴ௜௧~ܰ[0, ܸܽݎ(ܣܴ௜௧)] with  
ܸܽݎ(ܣܴ௜௧) ≈ ߪఌ௜
ଶ  . Moreover, the CARs are analyzed for specific periods over the event 
window. In the literature of M&A studies, the researchers usually take into 
consideration 10 or even 50 days before and after the announcement day. In this specific 
research, the calculation of CARs and their statistical significance concerns the 
following event windows: [-20,-16], [-15,-11], [-10,-6], [-5,-1], [-2,+2], [1,5], [6,10], 
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[11,15], [16,20]. Consequently, the statistical significance of ARs can be checked with 
the following equation of standardized abnormal returns:  
SAR୧୲ =
୅ୖ౟౪
ୗ(୅ୖ౟౪)
       (3) 
  
Moreover, it obvious that CARs can be calculated cumulatively for specific study 
period [t1,t2] over the event window.  
CAR୧[୲ଵ,୲ଶ] = ∑ AR୧୲
୲ଶ
୲ୀ୲ଵ      (4) 
 
The statistical significance of CARs can be checked with the following equation: 
SCAR[୲ଵ,୲ଶ] =
େ୅ୖ[౪భ,౪మ]
ୗ൫େ୅ୖ[౪భ,౪మ]൯
     (5) 
 
The critical values for the hypothesis test of statistical significance were obtained 
from the t-student distribution for 5% level of significance. The following t-statistic is 
used to test results’ significance level:    
t =
୶തିஜబ
ୱ
√୬ൗ
                 (6) 
where s is the standard deviation of the sample, n is the sample size. 
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4. Data analysis & Discussion 
 
i. Stock Price Performance 
In this research, the basic objective is the assessment of the implications in an 
M&A deal announcement. In line with past empirical evidence, we examine the impact 
of corporate takeovers on the security price of both the buyer and the target firm of the 
deals, measuring the abnormal returns in specific periods over the event window. This 
stock reaction after a corporate takeover is easily observable for both the bidders and the 
targets of the shipping deals in Figures 2 and 3.  
Figure 2: Abnormal Stock Price Returns of acquirers 
Figure 3: Abnormal Stock Price Returns of targets 
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In order to draw useful results, following tables show the cumulative abnormal 
returns over specific event windows and their statistical significance. More specifically, 
the announcement of the corporate deal between Moller-Maersk A/S and D/S 1912 
affect the performance of stock prices in a positive manner in general. Hence, the 
announcement of the deal gave strong positive CAR to the bidder even 5 days prior the 
event date. The positive impact is easily observable in the event windows [-5,-1], [-
2,+2], [+1,+5], and [+5,+10]. Meanwhile, the same positive ad statistically significance 
impact on stock price performance is obvious for the target firm. The biggest and 
statistically significant CAR are easily seen in the event windows [-2,+2], [+1,+5], and 
[+5,+10]. As far as the other two deals of Moller- Maersk A/S are concerned, Moller 
Maersk realized much smaller CAR around the event date. It is also worth mentioning 
that the results presented in Table 4 show that Moller’s CARs seem to be negative. This 
reaction after an M&A announcement should be positive, but results do not follow the 
expectations. However, these two particular cases of takeovers by the Norwegian 
shipping giant are noticeable for the reason that the empirical research indicated 
significant positive impact for the target firms. Market reacted extremely positively in 
these two corporate deals. It is worth noting that Brostrom AB realized positive and 
statistically significant CARs except for the last event window [+16,+20]. Furthermore, 
investors’ preferences affect even more positively the stock performance of Royal P&O 
Nedlloyd NV because of the prominent deal. Specifically, we can note that stock returns 
note impressive increase during the period [-5,-1], [-2,+2]. Even though there were 
positive climate immediate before and after date of announcement, during the period [-
10,-6] gave significant negative CARs and all the periods after [+1,+5], [+6,+10], 
[+11,+15], [+16,+20], indicating investors’ doubts about the deal expectations. 
Moreover, the takeover of Quintana Maritime Ltd by Excel Maritime Carriers Ltd 
announced is another corporate deal in our study. Despite the negative CAR in the first 
two event windows [-20,-16], [-15,-11], the announcement of the deal gave positive 
CAR around the event date. However, the strongest and statistically significant CAR 
came up in 5 days period after the announcement. As we see Table 4, target firm 
realized very big positive CAR (40.14%) and this reverses the negative result of the 
period [-10,-6].  
The case of the deal between General Maritime and Arlington Tankers is a 
remarkable event. In most of the event windows [-15,-11], [-10,-6], [-5,-1], [-
2,+2],[+1,+5], [+6,+10] and [+11,+15] the bidder firm realized negative returns with the 
lowest ones two days before and after the event date. The same negative investment 
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climate is observable in the target firm with the most negative and significant event 
windows [-5,-1] and [-2,-2]. 
 In the case of Overseas Shipholding-Stelmar Shipping takeover, the biggest 
positive returns are received again by the target. The event windows after time zero may 
indicate a correction by the market. On the other hand, we have to mention that 
Shipholing Corporation realized mainly negative returns over the event windows. It is 
remarkable the evidence of five days before the announcement [-5,-1] where there are 
high negative returns [-11.74%].   
Additionally, Seabulk is another target firm which after the announcement of its 
takeover by Seacor shown the same behavior. In this case, we can see extremely high 
positive and significant CAR in the [+1,+5]. During the first three event windows [-20,-
16], [-15,-11], [-10,-6], there is positive stock reaction, however, the event windows [-
5,-1], [-2,+2] and [+1,+5] indicate low expectations for the corporate takeover.   
 Examining the last case of TUI-CP Ships, we can easily observe the positive 
impact on target’s stock performance. Even though CP Ships realized negative CARs 
during the last event windows [+6,+10], [+11,+15], [+16,+20], the presence of high 
positive expectations of this corporate deal gave high positive and significant returns is 
totally undisputable. Except for the event windows [-15,-11] and [+1,+5], indeed the 
low positive CARs are statistically insignificant in the former, the bidder of the deal is 
affected negatively.    
Empirical findings from both Table 4 and 5 indicate the positive impact especially 
for target firms which are involved in these kinds of announcements. As we can also 
clearly observe in Figure 5, there are negative CARs only for Arlington Corporation. 
Positive CARs indicate that target companies usually create financial value even though 
they have been acquired from another one. Furthermore, findings show that 
announcement referring the acquirers does not necessarily mean value creation for the 
acquirer’s shareholders value. Generally speaking, empirical research has shown that 
some investors have inside information about prominent deals which justifies the stock 
price increase and the big positive abnormal returns before the announcement date. The 
graph presented in Figure 4 which shows the biggest cumulative abnormal returns of 
Excel Maritime from all the other deals are the signal for further research of its 
corporate governance characteristics (see more in Appendix). 
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Table 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Statistical Significance of Acquirers 
                                                             
1 Results concern the deal AP Moller - Maersk A/S- D/S 1912 
2 Results concern the deal AP Moller - Maersk A/S- Brostrom AB 
3 Results concern the deal AP Moller - Maersk A/S- Royal P&O Nedlloyd NV 
(T1 , T2 ) (-20,-16) (-15,-11) (-10,-6) (-5,-1) (-2,+2) (+1,+5) (+6,+10) (+11,+15) (+16,+20) 
AP Moller - Maersk A/S1 
-3,12% 1,99% 0,12% 2,07% 6,53% 4,12% 4,99% -2,92% 2,14% 
(-1,69550) (4,12940) (1,85953) (4,43578) (2,25666) (5,61877) (3,54468) (-6,32242) (10,46517) 
Excel Maritime Carriers Ltd 
-9,71% -22,95% 7,22% 5,59% 12,26% 4,26% 1,87% 2,20% -7,55% 
(-4,393036) (-5,370778) (0,021751) (2,33543) (1,010514) (4,674982) (0,220572) (4,80943) (-1,112518) 
General Maritime Corp 
7,89% -3,47% -2,34% -5,89% -12,00% -4,05% -0,71% -1,00% 3,20% 
(6,452964) (-9,71164) (-1,42214) (-0,02613) (-3,96184) (-6,60990) (-0,660925) (-7,304773) (0,350808) 
AP Moller - Maersk A/S2 
-1,87% -3,61% 3,57% 0,80% 4,79% -2,29% -1,54% 0,72% -2,18% 
(0,764107) (-10,85831) (3,490133) (0,140318) (2,960321) (-1,85599) (-3,238305) (1,000986) (-3,050122) 
Overseas Shipholding Group Inc 
-2,89% 5,14% -4,58% -11,74% -3,42% -3,97% -8,18% -6,03% -0,53% 
(-11,4321) (4,880575) (-1,41963) (-2,94475) (-3,68537) (-5,30336) (-2,98229) (-3,572653) (1,3306) 
SEACOR Holdings Inc 
1,49% 4,06% 5,78% -1,39% -2,04% -3,69% 2,73% 0,00% -8,63% 
(2,16154) (2,08582) (19,15625) (0,10482) (-2,23951) (-0,68685) (0,696212) (-0,493794) (-3,24039) 
AP Moller - Maersk A/S3 
-0,42% 1,65% 3,65% -0,11% 0,29% -1,17% -1,70% 0,49% -0,29% 
(1,005907) (5,196241) (3,45801) (-3,46459) (3,52306) (-4,53479) (-10,15086) (2,622919) (0,014495) 
TUI AG 
-0,05% 1,36% -3,31% -6,81% -8,79% 1,92% -8,54% -5,50% -0,20% 
(0,550474) (0,406025) (-3,34463) (-1,06586) (-4,44366) (9,270743) (-2,526583) (-8,067747) (2,507534) 
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Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Statistical Significance of Targets 
(T1 , T2 ) (-20,-16) (-15,-11) (-10,-6) (-5,-1) (-2,+2) (+1,+5) (+6,+10) (+11,+15) (+16,+20) 
D/S 1912 
-1,88% 3,31% 0,10% 0,16% 6,13% 4,47% 5,67% -3,72% 0,92% 
(-1,407897) (3,397647) (0,776569) (1,161831) (1,447389) (7,605258) (4,330749) (-5,285491) (3,901027) 
Quintana Maritime Ltd 
5,12% -1,79% -30,60% 3,25% 40,14% 2,84% 3,24% -5,77% -1,26% 
(2,674262) (0,347607) (-4,026414) (-0,776868) (3,168473) (3,057293) (1,895237) (-0,129467) (0,693326) 
Arlington Tankers Ltd 
7,89% -2,74% -1,93% -10,09% -11,74% -5,04% -1,53% -3,04% 4,18% 
(2,536736) (-2,405571) (-4,077791) (-4,116232) (-3,887086) (-10,58818) (-1,210753) (-6,139684) (2,016268) 
Brostrom AB 
6,88% 2,22% 5,87% 2,25% 11,60% 1,48% 3,45% 5,90% -0,87% 
(2,915786) (8,404011) (5,117521) (1,656674) (3,458718) (2,931499) (6,928332) (3,135655) (-2,377394) 
Stelmar Shipping Ltd 
3,52% 3,21% -3,27% 1,56% 6,29% -0,76% -1,90% -0,56% -0,79% 
(3,839953) (2,209639) (-2,045173) (3,89051) (2,097629) (-9,679302) (-5,324073) (-6,756091) (-2,715144) 
Seabulk International Inc 
0,24% 9,35% -4,13% -1,93% 20,29% 22,64% 0,95% -0,14% -6,80% 
(-0,169743) (3,269511) (-0,866661) (-1,470278) (1,374614) (34,66204) (-6,231194) (-4,419621) (-3,581247) 
Royal P&O Nedlloyd NV 
-2,49% -2,43% -5,58% 25,41% 32,37% -2,57% -2,47% -1,75% -0,40% 
(0,020745) (-1,50309) (-5,119763) (1,971335) (3,846371) (-2,221803) (-5,803214) (-1,135309) (0,216018) 
CP Ships 
3,33% 5,67% -0,69% 8,82% 12,84% 3,05% -0,52% -2,45% -3,02% 
(5,889163) (5,366796) (-1,125614) (4,693367) (3,935146) (5,583466) (1,190954) (-2,337797) (-7,537752) 
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Figure 4: Cumulative Abnormal of Acquirers 
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ii. Corporate Governance characteristics 
 The globalization of the world economy in combination with a highly 
competitive environment has increased the number of shipping companies which are 
interested in corporate governance issues. Consequently, ownership structure, CEO 
duality, the board of directors in particular and corporate governance more broadly, 
ranks high in the strategic agenda of maritime corporations. The question arises 
naturally whether the corporate governance system of each firm can follow prominent 
challenges. According to OECD principles, there are specific characteristics which 
define how well-organized each corporate governance system is.  Corporate governance 
possesses a vital role for each firm and may play a catalytic role in takeover decisions. 
The possibility that a takeover deal may be motivated by managers’ personal incentives 
given large premiums cannot be ruled out. 
Nowadays, some firms allow their Chief Executive Officer to hold the position 
of Chairman of the Board of Directors while other firms choose to split those two 
positions between two different individuals. Shipping firms are mainly family. The 
members of the family are the controlling group and there is not a real distinction 
between ownership and management of the firm. Hence, in many firms there is a 
possibility of existence of CEO duality where the same person holds the chairman 
position and he is the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation as well. The person 
who takes over these two crucial positions for the corporation, he concentrates great 
power and this is something that it can be proved positive for the corporation for the 
reason that it is much easier for making decisions or negative because he will probably 
take advantage of his power of this double position which holds in order to satisfy 
private benefits. From the perspective of agency theory, Chief Executive Officer (agent) 
is responsible for utility maximizing and risk minimizing in a firm. He makes the 
appropriate decisions in order to improve the welfare at the expense of shareholders 
(principals). On the other hand, Board of Directors supervises the options of Chief 
Executive Officer. Consequently, when a firm present CEO Duality this means that the 
separation between ownership and management is probably corrupted. Finally, firm’s 
performance is negatively affected due to the fact that Chief Executive Officer has 
major power and he makes decisions for his own private benefit. Moreover, many other 
recent studies support the idea that agency theory is very restrictive for Chief Executive 
Officers. On condition that chairman of the board of the directors and the firm’s Chief 
Executive Officer as well, the firm can reap the benefit of this for the reason that there is 
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a focused leadership which boosts the CEO’s flexibility to make strategic decisions. 
Furthermore, this produces a further incentive to him to do his best and it will be 
profitable for the whole firm.  
One major supervisor on management is the Board of Directors which is elected 
by shareholders. In extreme circumstances, it is responsible for making decisions on 
crucial corporate issues. In fact, there is not an optimal size of the board, though it is no 
acceptable to be larger than this which is predicted by the law.  
Another crucial point for firm’s sustainability is ownership structure for the 
reason that it plays a key role in agency problems between managers and shareholders. 
Many times, managers may divert firms’ resources thus increasing their personal wealth 
and the possibility that they make decision for a potential takeover deal based on their 
own interests cannot be ruled out.  
Governance is indisputably a key characteristic which defines how a corporate 
entity reacts in a potential takeover. On the other hand, a takeover attempt could be a 
key reason to make policy makers rethink the strategies of the firm. However, corporate 
governance mechanisms are not expected to affect the overall deal value but they could 
affect the short-term stock returns between acquirer and target shareholders.  In relation 
to CEO duality, it cannot guarantee corporate profitability after a takeover but there is 
no doubt that the separation of control and ownership is one of prerequisite for 
significant and positive abnormal returns because of positive market expectations 
related to a possible deal (Raghavan, Iyeyangar, Ernast, Zampelli 2009). 
Examining with greater caution the acquirer of the deal with the biggest 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns in our sample, it is worth examining the corporate 
governance model of Excel Maritime. Despite the fact that it presents CEO duality, its 
Board of Directors consists of just 10 members. When a firms presents CEO duality, 
manager could act based on their motives. As potential takeover deals are major threats 
for managers’ positions, this creates further doubts about the maximization of corporate 
value for the sake of shareholders and any other contributive part. Only if investors hold 
a substantial part of the voting capital, they will be able to control managerial actions 
and force them to distribute profits to shareholders. In a period of crisis, an independent 
board in Excel Maritime may react more efficiently and implement the necessary 
strategies for change or improvement. As far as the ownership structure is concerned, 
the majority of shareholders are investment managers. Nevertheless, ownership 
concentration may not be a good indicator of corporate governance efficiency due to the 
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fact that corporate owner identity can be a more important determinant of corporate 
control (Lehmann, Weigand 2000).  
Table 6: Ownership Structure of Excel Maritime 
Investor Type Investors % O/S Pos Val ($MM) 
Investment Managers 144 14,86 12.619.909 40,22 
Brokerage Firms 21 0,49 417.590 1,29 
Strategic Entities 3 46,10 39.161.739 220,48 
   Holding Companies 1 39,05 33.170.966 186,75 
   Corporations 1 5,92 5.032.520 28,33 
   Individuals 1 1,13 958.253 5,39 
   Government Agency 0 0,00 0 0,00 
Total - All Holders 168 61,45 52.199.238 262,00 
Insider Filings (As Reported)    
Insider 0 0,00 0 0,00 
 
Excel Maritime’s characteristic (Table 6) is in line with the empirical evidence of 
Lambertides and Louca (2008) that foreign shareholders and investment corporation 
shareholders may facilitate better corporate governance and monitor management 
effectively. However, it is not apparent that internal control by insiders, family interests, 
banks, allied industrial firms and Holding Companies guides to the improvement of 
corporate performance.  
The opposite may hold if there is a large shareholder attached to the firm who 
motivates managers and all contributive parties in a corporation. In this specific case, it 
is also worth mentioning that there is significant concentration of managerial ownership 
and this is easily observable from the simple fact that top five investors holds more than 
10% of the total ownership. Indeed, it is notable that Lhada Holdings holds 39.05% of 
the firm’s ownership. On the other hand, on condition that this large shareholder takes 
on a know-all strategy and creates major conflicts between the interested parties, a 
neutral investor, such as a bank, is better for the corporate governance and corporate 
performance. 
Table 7: Ownesrship Concentration of Excel Maritime 
Top Ten Investors     
Investor Name % O/S Pos Investor Type 
Lhada Holdings, Inc. 39,05 33.170.966 Strategic Entities 
Argon, S.A. 5,92 5.032.520 Strategic Entities 
Dimensional Fund Advisors, 
LP 
3,52 2.990.459 Investment Managers 
BlackRock Institutional Trust 
Company, N.A. 
1,81 1.535.206 Investment Managers 
Mende (Hans-Juergen) 1,13 958.253 Strategic Entities 
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To sum up, corporate acquisitions are among the largest investments and they 
can rise from obscurity conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders. Past 
empirical findings from relevant literature have shown that family CEOs contribute to 
the improvement of shipping firm’s financial performance measured by profitability 
ratios (ROE, ROA). Despite the fact that an independent Board of Directors is an 
important determinant for an efficient corporate governance system, shipping firms 
have taken advantage of a family based ownership model and have experienced very 
strong growth rates. 
 
 
Figure 6: ROA of the acquirers 
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The primary object of this dissertation thesis is the corporate governance 
implications and the economic result of a corporate deal between shipping firms. The 
M&A announcements tested for both the acquirers and the targets shareholders returns 
in specified event windows. It was clearly indicated that the biggest abnormal returns 
are observed in two days before and after the date of announcement. M&A deals gave 
significant positive impact mainly in target firms for the reason that they are followed 
by positive market expectations. On the other hand, examining the stock price 
performance of the acquirers, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) are positive 
around [-2, +2] and after [+1, +5] [+6, +10] the announcement date. In relation to the 
targets, it is easily conceivable that the big CARs for the targets even five days prior the 
announcement date clearly indicate the presence of inside information about prominent 
deals. Hence, there is a significant increase of cumulative abnormal returns in the event 
windows [-5,-1] and [-2, +2]. However, the results in Tables 4 and 5 show some 
differences in the behavior of participants to M&A announcements. Generally speaking, 
the results support that the announcements of M&As have direct positive impact in the 
stock price performance of the target shipping firms. This specific dissertation thesis 
ensures that takeovers, except for the developing aspects for the contributing 
corporations, add financial value increasing shareholders’ wealth. In line with past 
relevant literature, this kind of corporate deals can improve target firm’s performance 
by replacing inefficient corporate governance systems, corporate restructurings or 
introducing new technological methods to meet modern market conditions. Although 
this study supports the perception that specific corporate governance characteristics can 
influence the response of a firm in a potential corporate deal, there also many other 
factors that influence takeovers. It underlines the central role of corporate governance in 
the shipping firms, taking into consideration CEO duality, ownership structure and 
ownership concentration. This specific research examined the case of Excel Maritime, 
due to the fact that it experienced the most important cumulative abnormal returns from 
all the other bidders. The major characteristics of Excel Maritime’s governance model 
are the presence of CEO duality and high ownership concentration. All these findings 
verify all relevant past literature that indicates the traditional corporate governance 
model of Greek shipping firms. However, it should be mentioned that this type of 
governance gave high profitability levels in the past. Strategic decisions related to 
corporate governance issues are quite interesting for further research with a wide range 
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of corporate governance elements in order to assess the level of impact of an M&A 
announcement. 
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7. Appendices 
     
  
 
  
Figure 7: CAR of Seacor-Seabulk Figure 8: CAR of Moller-Royal 
Figure 10: CAR of Excel-Quintana Figure 9: CAR of Moller-DS1910 
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Figure 11: CAR of Overseas-Stelmar Figure 12: CAR of General Maritime-Arlington 
Figure 13: CAR of Moller-Brostrom Figure 14: CAR of TUI-CP Ships 
